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Abstract 
In developing capital markets dominated by individual investors, there is a potential for greater disparity in the interests of 
institutional investors and controlling shareholders and this has implications for the trading and monitoring activities of 
institutional investors in these markets, particularly around high impact corporate decisions. We examine the trading 
activities of mutual funds (as the largest institutional investor in this market) in corporate acquisition activities where there 
is potential for a wide disparity of interest between institutional investors and controlling shareholders. We find that Top 
Mutual Fund Management Company (TFC) have strong incentives to trade and realize profits over the event months for 
fear of price drop due to the mean reversion and herding effect in Chinese capital market. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Prior studies have documented the key role of institutional investors and their influence on corporate 
activities, such as antitakeover amendments, investment decisions, management compensation and M&A 
announcements (Brickley et al., 1990; Agrawal & Mandelker, 1990; Bushee, 1998; Hartzell & Starks, 2003; 
Borokhovich et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2007). In these studies, the underlying mechanism through which 
institutional ownership is assumed to impact corporate decisions is through trading based on the information 
advantage and monitoring. In this setting, institutional monitoring consists of both information gathering and 
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efforts to influence management of the companies (Chen, Harford and Li, 2007) in which these institutions 
invest.  
 
 This paper explores the issue of institutional trading in the Chinese market, where unlike in the US or 
other developed markets, institutional investors in China own a lower proportion of the equity market. In 
particular we study this issue in the context of mergers and acquisitions in Chinese market where there is a 
potential of severe interest conflict between institutions and controlling shareholders. This paper follows 
Brickley, Lease and Smith Jr. (1988) classification, and focus on mutual funds, who have less business ties 
with their firms underlying their investments and thus are more likely to trade based on the information 
collected on certain corporate event, such as Merger & Acquisitions. 
  
We contribute to the literature on institutional monitoring by examining institutional investors’ trading 
activities in an emerging capital market where institutional investors control far less portion of the equity 
market, and there is potentially more behavioral biases in the market due to dominant shareholding position of 
the individual investor. Our results show that Top (largest) Mutual Fund Management Company (hereafter 
TFC) who collectively hold the largest portion of tradable shares in acquiring firms, significantly increase 
their holdings in acquiring firms in the pre-event period, but as the active traders in this market, they tend to 
decrease their holdings over the event announcement quarter in order to realize the profits. The aggregate 
buying decision and selling decision of all mutual funds, however,  is  not related with “deal quality. There is 
however, some evidence that TFC (as the largest shareholders in acquiring firms among all mutual funds) 
tend to increase holdings in good quality M&A deals, under the assumption that institutional investors have 
the potential to gather information and monitor the companies in which they invest. 
 
. 
2. Hypotheses development 
 
Bushee (1998) and Bushee (2001) suggest that mutual funds may engage in pre-event information 
gathering and short term post event trading activities for myopic behavioral reasons. Also the size of the 
mutual funds and fund managers’ bonus are linked with the ranking and profits of the fund management 
company. In a market where mutual funds have a less dominant position, a better strategy to secure a higher 
return for them is to spend time on event specific information gathering and use this information to monitor if 
necessary. Once the M&A event has materialized, mutual funds sell part of their holdings to realize the profits 
in order to reduce the risk of share price drop (the  share price drop may come from other investor’s sell-off 
activities once the formal information has been released).  
 
H1: The overall trading behavior of mutual funds is not related to “deal quality”. 
H2: TFC increase their holdings in the pre-event in better deals, but reduce their holdings over the event 
announcement quarter regardless of the quality of the deal, in order to realize profits.  
 
3. Data and Sample Description 
 
Our Mergers & Acquisitions data and mutual fund holding data are from the GTA  database. The sample 
covers the period from 2004 to 2008, as for the Chinese market  reliable mutual fund holding data are only 
available from 2003.The 3 year post-event operating and share return data (data until 2011) are collected from 
CSMAR database (one subsection of GTA database).  
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The initial sample of M&A events recorded in GTA database consist of 7552 deals (deal type includes 
Mergers, Acquisitions and Acquire major assets). To arrive at our final sample we require that (1) all M&A 
samples are domestic M&A (both acquirer and target are Chinese mainland company), (2) acquirers are listed 
in Chinese A share market, (3) financial sectors and related transaction are excluded. These conditions result 
in a final sample of 729 deals. Table 1 reports the industry distribution of these 729 deals. We see that our 
sample covers all 21 major industries as classified by CSRC (Chinese Security Regulatory Commission), 
except for financial sector. There are more acquisition deals in machinery, real estate and petrochemicals 
industries than any other industries, while the lowest number of deals is in communication and cultural 
industry, accounting for only 0.27% of the total sample. 
 
Table 1: Acquirer CSRC Industry Distribution 
 
Table 1A reports the distribution of M&A announcements across Industries. The industry classifications are 
based on the China Securities Regulation Committee (CSRC) industry classification.  The sample is after the 
following conditions are met: (1) The M&A firms are domestic firms (both acquirer and target are Chinese 
mainland companies) ; (2) The acquirers are listed on the Chinese A share market and (3) does not include 
firms in the financial sectors or related transactions. 
 
CSRC Industry Classification  No. of Deals %  
Machinery 84 11.52% 
Real estate 73 10.01% 
Petrochemicals 64 8.78% 
Comprehensive 61 8.37% 
Metals & Non -metals 55 7.54% 
Wholesale and retail trade 53 7.27% 
Pharmaceuticals 48 6.58% 
Transportation 44 6.04% 
Utilities 36 4.94% 
Social Services 29 3.98% 
IT 27 3.70% 
Food & Beverage 26 3.57% 
Textiles & Apparel 23 3.16% 
Agriculture, forestry, livestock farming, fishery 22 3.02% 
Construction 22 3.02% 
Mining 16 2.19% 
Paper & Printing 12 1.65% 
Electronics 12 1.65% 
Other manufacturing 11 1.51% 
Timber & Furnishings 9 1.23% 
Communication and Cultural Industry  2 0.27% 
Total 729 100.00% 
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4. Mutual fund trading activities around M&A event 
 
This section presents the results of the analysis of mutual fund’s holding around M&A events, and 
examines the factors that affect their trading activities. The Table 2A shows the summary statistics for mutual 
fund holdings around M&A events, the collective holdings by TFC in 2 quarters before the event date are on 
average (max) 0.1028% (7.33%) of tradable shares in their invested company, and this holding has gradually 
increased to 0.9937% (max value: 9.33%) at the quarter end just before event announcement date. After event 
announcement quarter, the holding has decreased to 0.32% and 0.22% respectively in the one and two 
quarters after events. On the other hand, holdings by all mutual funds is about 0.597% in 2 quarters before 
event date, further increased to about 2.76% just before the event announcement quarter, again this number 
has decreased to 1.36% two quarters after event announcement. Further analysis by calculating the change of 
holding over different quarters around corporate M&A event (results shown in Table 2B) suggest that TFC 
increase their holding about 0.66% to 0.89% over the 1 to 2 quarters before the event time, but reduce their 
holdings over the event announcement quarter (on average about 0.668%, test significant at 1% level), further 
sell another 0.11% in the quarter after that. Similarly, holdings by all mutual funds are also increased by 
around 0.28% to 2.16% before events, but on average sells about 0.95% in the event quarter, again the change 
of holding by all mutual funds are test significant.  
 
Table 2: Holdings and Change in Holdings of TFC and All Mutual Funds 
 
Table 3 reports the average percentage holding by Top Holding Fund Company (TFC) and all mutual funds in 
acquiring firms (Panel A) and the results of the test of significance of the average percentage change in 
holding of Top Holding Fund Company (TFC) and all mutual funds in acquiring firms over various quarters 
(Panel B). In Panel A, DataAnn-2Q: 2 quarters prior to M&A announcement; DataAnn-1Q: 1 quarter prior to 
M&A announcement; Date Ann Qtr: quarter-end just prior to M&A announcement; DataAnn+1Q: 1 quarter 
after M&A event announcement; DataAnn+2Q: 2 quarters after M&A event announcement. In Panel B, (-2Q 
to 0Q): over 2-quarter period until the end of quarter just before M&A announcement. (-1Q to 0Q): over 1-
quarter period until the end of quarter just before M&A announcement. Event Qtl: event announcement 
quarter; (Q0 to Q1): over 1-quarter period following the M&A announcement quarter; (Q0 to Q2): over 2-
quarter period following the M&A announcement quarter. ***, **, * shows significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level 
respectively. No of observations is 729. 
 
Panel A: Percentage Holding at Quarter End 
Period Mean Std. Dev. Min MAX 
TFC (%) 
Date Ann  -2Q 0.103 0.570 0 7.337 
Date Ann -1Q 0.334 1.183 0 9.225 
Date Ann Qtr 0.994 1.846 0 9.338 
Date Ann +1Q 0.325 1.176 0 9.996 
Date Ann +2Q 0.223 0.958 0 7.624 
All Mutual Funds (%) 
Date Ann -2Q 0.597 2.712 0 36.287 
Date Ann -1Q 2.470 6.526 0 52.157 
Date Ann Qtr 2.759 6.806 0 52.157 
Date Ann +1Q 1.804 5.694 0 44.829 
Date Ann +2Q 1.364 5.405 0 53.562 
 
Period Mean Std. Dev. Min MAX 
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TFC 
(-2Q to 0Q) 0.891***  1.729 -1.073 9.338 
(-1Q to 0Q) 0.660***  1.718 -3.619 9.338 
Event Qtr -0.668***  1.573 -9.338 5.273 
(Q0 to Q1) -0.102**  1.090 -7.289 7.131 
(Q0 to Q2) 0.006 1.282 -7.289 9.299 
All Mutual Funds 
(-2Q to 0Q) 2.162***  6.071 -8.359 52.157 
(-1Q to 0Q) 0.289 8.488 -48.860 52.157 
Event Qtr -0.955***  6.292 -48.860 38.418 
(Q0 to Q1) -1.394***  6.586 -52.157 23.688 
(Q0 to Q2) 0.994**  10.405 -52.157 60.784 
 
We then try to explain whether the change of mutual fund holding before and during the event quarters can 
be explained by perceived quality of the deals. We follow the regression analysis by Chen et al. (2007): 
 
ܥ݄ܽ݊݃݁݅݊ܪ݋݈݀݅݊݃ݏ௜௧ ൌן଴൅ߚଵܲ݁ݎܿ݁݅ݒ݁݀ܦ݈݁ܽܳݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ௜௧ ൅෍ߚ௜
௡
௜ୀଶ
ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ܸܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜ 
 
 
The intuition of this equation is that if the fund management team has superior ability to predict the quality 
of the deal, or the mutual fund has general knowledge regarding the event firms’ management team on their 
ability to make good decision and produce good quality deal , we should observe the coefficient on observed 
deal quality significantly related to the change of the holding before the event quarters. Control variables are 
used to explain the normal change of mutual fund holding. 
 
We use three proxies as measures of deal quality: (1) one-year post-event buy and hold abnormal return 
(bhary1), where the benchmark are the 10 size deciles reference portfolios following methods by Lyon et al. 
(1999);  (2) the post-event 12-month abnormal operating performance - industry median adjusted Return on 
Asset (roam12) , and (3) industry median adjusted Return on Equity (roem12), where we use CSRC  industry 
classification to calculate industry median ROA and ROE.  
 
The control variables follows Gompers & Metrick (2001) and Parrino et al. (2003) studies of the 
determinants of change of institutional holdings. The control variables include both short term and long term 
momentum variables: cumulative abnormal return over -10 days to -1 days before event time (car101) and pre 
event one year buy and hold abnormal return (bharpre12m), adjusted for size reference portfolio as described 
above. Acquiring firm size (log of acquirer market capitalization – lnsize) and acquiring firm book to market 
ratio (acqbtmv) at the end of year before event announcement date, turnover for the event announcement 
quarter (turn0), and 2 quarters (turn6m) in advance, turnover are calculated by the period specific trading 
volume divided by the outstanding number of shares, eoydum represents the end of year dummy.  
 
We first examine all mutual funds trading activities and its relation with observed deal quality. Regression 
4-6 (panel A of Table 3) shows that none of the three observed deal quality measures are related to the change 
of total mutual fund holdings in announcement quarter (Q0), suggesting that mutual funds generally sell their 
shares regardless the quality of the deal in the event quarter. Regression 1 to 3 shows that the change of 
holding in the 2 quarters before the deal announcement also does not relate with deal quality, suggesting that 
the total holding by all mutual funds is not a good indicator of good M&A deals, this supports our Hypothesis 
1.  
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We then turn to the trading activities of TFC in Panel B., different from the results of the regressions 1-3 of 
Panel A, regressions 2 and 3 in Panel B shows that the coefficients of two of the observed deal quality are 
significant, suggesting that TFC increases their holding in their “perceived good quality” acquiring firms 
around 6 months before event period. Their ability to forecast good quality deal may come from their strong 
research team, private information through large holdings or their monitoring and influencing ability to the 
management team, in order to produce good quality deals.  
 
While, regression 4 to 6 of Panel B shows the trading activities by TFC in the event announcement quarter, 
where trading activities by TFC are not related with deal quality and this suggests that TFC’s trading decision 
is not linked with deal quality, we also see the statistics from Table 2B that on average TFC sell about 0.668% 
shares of M&A event firms in the announcement quarters, both the regression results and change of holding 
from Table 2 suggests that  TFC may simply choose to sell shares and realize profits over the event quarters 
regardless the quality of the deal, again above results support our hypothesis 2.  
 
This section examines the mutual funds’ ability to gather and process the information, and make their 
trading decision based on this information. In summary, we find that the level of holding by all mutual funds 
is not a spurious indicator of “deal qualityÿ, and their trading decisions are also not related with the 
perceived deal quality. There is some evidence that TFC increase their holding in “good quality” deals before 
formal announcement, but sell their holdings over the event quarter regardless of the quality of the deal, in 
order to realize the profits.  
 
Table 3: Mutual Funds trading activities and deal quality 
 
Table 4 reports the results of testing the impact of perceived deal quality on the trading activities of 
mutual funds’ around M&A announcement quarters. p-values in parentheses.  ***, **, * shows 
significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
DV: Change of holding over 2 Quarters Prior to M&A 
announcement quarter 
DV: change of holding over M&A 
Announcement quarter 
Panel A: All Mutual Fund Trading Activities 
Perceived Deal Quality 
roam12 -7.339 4.99 
-0.149 -0.393 
roem12 -0.063 0.665 
-0.975 -0.776 
bhary1 0.0617 -0.34 
-0.849 -0.359 
Intercept -21.154*** -21.287*** -20.366*** 14.817** 13.770** 13.990** 
0 0 0 -0.021 -0.034 -0.029 
N 652 647 662 659 654 669 
adj. R-sq 0.232 0.229 0.226 0.03 0.032 0.027 
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Control 
Variable Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year 
Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind 
Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: TFC Trading Activities 
roam12 2.13 0.164 
-0.13 -0.904 
roem12 1.247** -0.573 
-0.025 -0.292 
bhary1 0.184** -0.141 
-0.042 -0.112 
Intercept -2.590** -1.786 -2.701** 0.9 0.33 0.745 
-0.02 -0.138 -0.016 -0.549 -0.826 -0.625 
N 652 647 662 659 654 669 
adj. R-sq 0.246 0.256 0.235 0.121 0.137 0.114 
Control 
Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year 
Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind 
Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
5 Conclusions: 
 
This paper examines the trading activities of mutual funds in Chinese corporate acquisition activities where 
there is the potential for a wide disparity between institutional investors and controlling shareholders’ interests. 
We contribute to the existing literature by examining the role of a “transient investors” who operate in a 
developing capital market with lower institutional investor holding and more investor behavioral biases. Our 
results show that mutual funds, as a professional investor with information advantage, spend time on 
gathering M&A event-specific information and trade on that information. Especially TFC have strong 
incentives to trade and realize profits over the event months for fear of price drop due to the mean reversion 
and herding effect in Chinese capital market. 
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